Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of their bids. A structural empirical model compares adaptation costs to bidder markups and shows that adaptation costs account for 8-14 percent of the winning bid. Markups from private information and market power, the focus of much of the auctions literature, are much smaller by comparison. Implications for government procurement are discussed. JEL classifications: D23, D82, H57, L14, L22, L74. * We thank Liran Einav,
Introduction
The benefits of using auctions to procure goods and services are well known and vigorously advocated. Competitive bidding results in low prices and limits favoritism. Employing auctions to procure standard goods such as pencils, printers and book-keeping software is straightforward, yet procuring custom made goods and services to fit a buyer's unique needs poses challenges. First, the buyer must spend resources to translate operational needs into well defined and communicable specifications. Second, needs for adaptations and changes often result from inadequate designs and specifications, changes in the external environment, or more generally, the extent to which the initial contract is incomplete.
Incomplete contracts force the buyer and supplier to negotiate adaptations both to the scope of work and to compensation, which may result in considerable discrepancies between the winning bid and the final payment. A well known example is the "Big Dig" highway artery in Boston, for which 12,000 changes to more than 150 contracts led to $1.6 billion in cost overruns, most of which can be traced back to unsatisfactory design. 1 One source of cost overruns is the additional work that was not anticipated. In addition, adaptation costs are incurred by disruptions to the normal flow of work that could have been avoided with adequate planning in advance. Renegotiating the contract also generates adaptation costs in the form of haggling, dispute resolution and opportunistic behavior.
Despite the prevalence of incomplete contracts, their effect on procurement in general, and on adaptation costs in particular are ignored almost without exception in both the theoretical and empirical auction literatures. This paper contributes by offering a first attempt to measure the economic costs of ex post adaptations that result from incomplete contracts. We develop a simple framework of bidding for incomplete contracts and apply it to highway procurement in the state of California. Our analysis suggests that adaptation costs are large, imposing significant extra costs on public procurement. Our approach is guided by three important features of highway procurement. First, given the competitive nature of the highway construction industry (publicly traded firms in our sample report profit margins of less than 3 percent), bidders must anticipate ex post changes and try to include any adaptation costs in their bids. Second, highway procurement uses "unit-price auctions" where contracts are summarized by a list of estimated input quantities required to do the job. A bidder submits a list of itemized (unit) prices, which multiplied by estimated quantities result in the bidder's total bid. The contractor with the lowest total bid wins the auction. Third, the winning total bid is seldom equal to the final compensation because ex ante estimated quantities and ex post actual quantities never perfectly agree.
Furthermore, changes in scope may be necessary when some specifications of the project need to be altered.
We develop a stylized model where contractors form rational expectations about the ways in which actual quantities will differ from estimated ones, as well as whether changes in scope will be required. Hence, expected changes in payments and adaptation costs will be incorporated into the bids ex ante. 2 We then apply the empirical framework of our model to a panel data set of highway contract bids that we have collected from Caltrans (California's Department of Transportation). The data includes bidder identities, bids, detailed cost estimates, and measures of cost advantages. Unlike most studies of procurement, our data also contains detailed information on how the initial designs were altered, including both estimated and actual quantities for all work items in the contract, as well as payments to the contractor from changes in scope.
Our empirical analysis first presents reduced form estimations where the strategy for identifying adaptation costs is based on our theoretical model. Suppose that the contractors all expect additional payments due to ex post changes. Controlling for production costs, if there were no adaptation costs then competition implies that for every extra dollar of profits, each contractor should lower its bid by exactly one dollar. If the regression is correctly specified, the coefficient on ex post additional payments should therefore be −1.
We find that some coefficients are closer to +1, implying that ex post changes on net generate more costs than revenue. Our estimates suggest that adaptation costs, which have until now been largely ignored, are substantial-on average they are between eight and fourteen percent of the winning bid.
A concern with our identification strategy is that complex projects, for which ex post changes are likely, also have higher production costs. This would confound adaptation costs with production costs and curtail our results. We address this concern using an instrumental variables strategy and identify an exogenous shifter of ex post payments that is uncorrelated with project characteristics. As we explain in section 4.3, we use the identity of the Caltrans engineer assigned to the project as an instrument for changes to compensation. Individual engineers have discretion over ex post adjustments, making some engineers easier to work with while others are known to cause problems. Engineers are randomly assigned to manage several projects and their identities are known to contractors at the time of bidding, allowing us to identify adaptation costs using engineer assignments.
In order to quantify the magnitude of adaptation costs as a markup over production costs, we estimate a structural model that builds on our theoretical analysis and decomposes markups into three components. First, as in any auction model, markups are a function of private information and local market power. Second, as in Athey and Levin (2001) , who investigate behavior in unit-price timber auctions, we estimate the impact of "unbalanced" bids. Namely, contractors can increase expected profits by increasing (decreasing) unit prices on items that are expected to overrun (under-run). Third, we estimate the adaptation costs from changes to the initial specifications (estimated quantities) to uncover the ex post costs of misspecified ex ante designs. The structural model estimates are consistent with the reduced form findings and show that adaptation costs are larger than the other two mark-up drivers. We conclude our empirical analysis with a conservative bounding strategy to find upper and lower bounds on the adaptation costs. We continue to find large and significant estimates of adaptation costs under these two specifications, and conclude that our estimates suggest that adaptation and changes are a major determinant of bids in this industry and an important potential source of inefficiency.
While largely ignored in the empirical procurement literature, concerns over the impact of adaptation costs are prevalent in the construction management literature (See Hinze (1993) , Clough and Sears (1994) , and Sweet (1994) ). The earliest foundations of transaction costs economics (Williamson (1971) ) argue that incomplete contracts imply both needs for adaptation and potential frictions. This idea has been explored in the procurement literature, and several studies emphasize the importance of adaptation costs including Crocker and Reynolds (1993), Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009) .
Our paper contributes to this literature because, to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical estimates of the dollar value of these costs. We demonstrate that standard methods for estimating auctions can be modified to yield an estimate of adaptation costs in procurement auctions. This paper also contributes to the literature on structural estimation of auctions (See, e.g., Paarsch (1992) , Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Krasnokutskaya (2011) .) First, our estimates imply that adaptation costs, which have until now been largely ignored, seem to impose more distortions and frictions as compared with market power and unbalanced bidding. Second, our results suggest that profit markups in standard bidding models are often misspecified because they do not account for the discrepancies between initial bids and final payments, omitting important parts of a contractor's revenues and costs. This in turn implies that policies geared towards reducing the amount of contractual incompleteness may have large benefits by reducing the costs of public procurement.
Competitive Bidding for Highway Contracts
Highway construction, as well as other public sector procurement, is often done using unitprice contracts. (See, e.g., Hinze (1993) .) Government engineers first prepare a list of items that describe the tasks and materials required for the job. In the contracts we study, items include laying asphalt, installing new sidewalks and striping the highway. For each work item, engineers provide an estimate of the quantity needed to complete the job. For example, they might estimate 25,000 tons of asphalt, 10,000 square yards of sidewalk and 50 rumble strips. The itemized list is publicly advertised along with a detailed set of plans and specifications that describe how the project is to be completed.
An interested contractor will bid per unit prices for each work item on the engineer's list. Figure 1 shows an example of the structure of a completed bid, which must be sealed and submitted prior to a set date. When the bids are opened, the contract is awarded to the contractor with the lowest estimated total bid, defined as the sum of the estimated individual line item bids. 3 
Item Description
Estimated Quantity Per Unit Bid Estimated Item Bid First, if the difference between estimated and actual quantities is large, or if it is thought to be due to negligence by one party, both sides will renegotiate an adjustment of compensation. 4 Using our example, if the asphalt ran over by 10,000 tons, Caltrans would hesitate to pay an extra $250,000, and the parties may negotiate an adjustment to lower the total bill. In our data, adjustments are recorded as a lump sum change, but this may also be a way for parties to adjust the implied unit price on a particular item.
Second, there may be a change in scope. For instance, the original scope might be to resurface 2 miles of highway. However, the engineers and contractor might discover that the subsurface is not stable and that certain sections need to be excavated and have gravel added, an activity that was not originally described. In most cases, the contractor and Caltrans will negotiate a change order that amends the scope of the contract as well as the final payment. If negotiations break down, this may lead to arbitration or a lawsuit.
Payments from changes will appear in two ways. One is that changes in the actual ex post quantities of pre-specified items will be compensated for through the unit prices. Another is by extra payments may to reflect the use of unanticipated materials or other adjustment costs, and they are recorded as extra work in our data.
Finally, the payment may be altered because of deductions. If work is not completed on time or if it fails to meet specifications, Caltrans may deduct liquidated damages. Such deductions are often a source of disputes between Caltrans and the contractor. The contractor may argue that the source of the delay is poor planning or inadequate specifications provided by Caltrans, while Caltrans might argue that the contractor's negligence is the source of the problem. The final deductions imposed may be the outcome of heated negotiations or even lawsuits and arbitrations between contractors and Caltrans.
It is widely believed in the industry that some contractors attempt to strategically manipulate their bids in anticipation of changes to the payment. Contractors read the plans and specifications to forecast the likelihood and magnitude of changes to the contract.
For instance, consider the example of Figure 1 , in which the total bid is $715,250. Suppose that after reading the plans and specifications, the contractor expects asphalt to overrun by 5,000 tons and sidewalk to under-run by 3,000 square feet. If he changes his bid on sidewalk to $5.00 and his bid on asphalt to $26.60 then his total bid will be unchanged. However, this will increase the contractors' expected total payment to $833,750.00 (266 × 30 000 + 5 × 7000 + 5 × 50) compared to $813,750.00 when bids of $25.00 and $9.00 are entered.
This increases his total payment without increasing his total bid, fixing his probability of winning. A bid is referred to as unbalanced if it has unusually high unit prices on some items (expected to overrun) and unusually low unit prices on others (expected to under-run).
Athey and Levin (2001) note that the optimal strategy for a risk neutral contractor is to submit a bid that has zero unit prices for some items that are overestimated, and put all the actual costs on items that are underestimated. In the data, however, while zero unit price bids have been observed, they are very uncommon. Athey and Levin suggest that one reason for this is risk aversion. After speaking with industry participants and reading industry sources we believe that for construction contracts other considerations are more important. In particular, Caltrans is not required to accept the low bid if it is deemed to be irregular (see Sweet (1994) for an in depth discussion of irregular bids). A highly unbalanced bid is a sufficient condition for a bid to be deemed irregular. As a result, a bid with a zero unit price is very likely, if not certain, to be rejected. 5 Also, the Standard Specifications and the Construction Manual indicate that unit prices on items that overrun by more than 25 percent are open to renegotiation. In these negotiations, Caltrans engineers will attempt to estimate a fair market value for a particular unit price based on bids submitted in previous auctions and other data sources. Caltrans may also insist on renegotiating unit prices even when the overrun is less than 25 percent if the unit prices differ markedly from estimates. This suggests that there are additional limitations on the benefits of submitting a highly unbalanced bid.
Bidding for Incompletely Specified Contracts
In this section we use the factual descriptions above to develop a simple variant of a standard private values auction model that will be the basis for our empirical models.
Basic Setup
A project is characterized by tasks,  = 1   and a vector of estimated quantities, q  = (  1      ) for each task, and is communicated by the buyer to   1 commonly known bidders. The actual ex post quantities that will be needed to complete the task is given by
 and is independent of the bidder who is selected to perform the work. Since we focus on ex post adaptation costs and not ex ante private information rents, we assume an extreme form of asymmetric information between the buyer and the bidders.
We assume that each bidder has perfect foresight about the actual quantities q  while the buyer (Caltrans) is unaware of q  and only considers q  . Perfect foresight can naively be interpreted as the contractors knowing the actual q   By assuming that contractors are risk neutral, a more convincingly interpretation is that contractors do not have exact information about q  , but instead have symmetric uncertainty about the actual quantities, resulting in common rational expectations over actual quantities. This interpretation is useful for the empirical model because it generates a source of noise that is not specific to the contractor's information or the observable project characteristics.
Despite having symmetric information about q   bidders differ in their private information about their own costs of production. Let    denote bidder 's per unit cost to complete task  and let c  = (  1      ) ∈ R  + . The total cost to  for installing the vector of quantities q  will be c  · q  , the vector product of the costs and the actual quantities. The costs (type) of contractor  are drawn from a well behaved joint density   (c  ) with support on a compact subset of R  + . The distributions are common knowledge, but only contractor  knows c   Also costs are independently distributed conditional on publicly observed information. 6 Hence, bidders have symmetric rational expectations about what needs to be done but they have asymmetric private information about the costs of production.
where    is his unit bid on item  The score of bidder  as his total bid   = b  · q  , and  wins the auction if and only if      for all  6 = . Hence, bidders participate in a simple linear scoring rule auction where each bid vector is transformed into a score, the estimated price.
Bidder 's total cost of producing actual quantities q  , which we refer to as his type, is denoted by   ≡ c  · q  . Let (b  ) be the gross revenue that bidder  expects to receive if 6 Private values is the common assumption for this industry (e.g., Porter and Zona (1993) , Krasnokutskaya (2011) ). Common values with multiple units is intractable and is beyond the scope of this paper. 8 he wins with a bid of b  . His expected profit is given by,
Revenues and adaptation costs
If the only source of revenue was determined by unit prices and actual quantities then revenues would equal b  · q  . As discussed earlier, however, gross revenue is affected by adjustments (), extra work (), and deductions (). As with actual quantities, we assume that these three components are independent of which bidder wins the contract, and that bidders have no control over them.
Because contractors are risk neutral and have symmetric rational expectations about adjustment costs, we introduce each of these three components as expected values, and include them additively into the bidders' profit function. In the absence of adaptation costs, the revenues to the winning bidder  are equal to
Any payments captured by  +  +  are just a transfer of funds from the buyer to the contractor. However, in the presence of adaptation costs every dollar that is transferred has less than its full impact on profits.
As discussed earlier, there are two kinds of adaptation costs. The first are direct adaptation costs due to disruption of the originally planned work. Changes can disrupt the efficient rhythm of work, and it is not unusual for changes to cut in half the amount of asphalt laid by a contractor in a day. The project may take twice as long to complete and perhaps double the labor and capital costs. 7 A second source of adaptation costs are indirect adaptation costs due to resources devoted to contract renegotiation and dispute 7 An example witnessed by one of the authors occurred while overlaying a concrete highway with asphalt where innumerable cracks had been patched with a dark, black "latex joint sealer". As paving began, the latex came in contact with hot asphalt, and the heated joint sealer would often explode through the freshly laid mat of asphalt. As a result, the latex joint sealer had to be removed from thousands of cracks by laborers using mostly hand tools before state engineers would allow the contractor to overlay the existing concrete road. This greatly slowed down the rate at which paving could occur, causing trucks to frequently stand in line for an hour before they could dump their asphalt into the paver. The contractor and the state engineers disagreed vehemently about the additional expense caused by the need to remove the crack sealer. Compensation for this change had to be renegotiated at length. resolution. 8 Each side may try to blame the other for any needed changes, and they may disagree over the best way to change the plans and specifications. Disputes over changes may generate a breakdown in cooperation on the project site and possibly lawsuits. 9 In reality, the contractual incompleteness that leads to adjustments, extra work and deductions will be positively correlated with the direct costs from disrupting the normal flow of work and the indirect costs of renegotiation. We assume that these extra costs are proportional to the size of adjustments, extra work and deductions. For example, the imposed adaptation cost from extra work  is given by   .
It is useful to distinguish between positive and negative ex post adjustments to revenues.
By definition, any extra work adds compensation to the contractor while any deduction reduces the contractor's compensation. This implies that   0 and   0. The adjustments , however, can be positive or negative. We separate these so that positive (negative) adjustments are labeled  +  0 ( −  0). For positive ex post income, adaptation costs cause surplus to be dissipated while for negative ex post income, adaptation costs cause the contractor to suffer a loss above and beyond the actual loss imposed by the adjustments or deductions. The (positive) coefficients  will measure these extra losses. Thus, we can write down the total ex post costs of adaptation as follows,
and the total revenue as
No adaptation costs imply the null hypothesis that  = 0. As a first step, this specification is useful because the lack of adaptation costs will be revealed by the data if the estimated coefficients are zero. If they are not, however, then this will indicate the presence of adaptation costs, the exact form of which can then be measured with more scrutiny. (In our empirical analysis the simple linear specification seems to best fit the data.)
To complete the specification of profits, we add a component that captures the loss from submitting irregular bids that are highly skewed. Given our risk neutrality assumption, if a bidder observes a difference between q  and q  then his incentive is to bid zero on items that are over-estimated and a high price on items that are under-estimated. As discussed in Section 2, however, contractors who submit bids that are too skewed risk having their bids rejected. Hence, skewing bids implies an expected cost on the bidders.
We impose a reduced form penalty that is increasing in the skewness of the bid. Clearly, the degree of skewness will depend on what "reasonable prices" would be. In practice, Caltrans engineers collect information from past bids and market prices to create an estimate   for the unit cost of contract item . Thus, given a vector of prices b  , a natural measure of skewness would be the distance from the "Blue Book" prices b = ( 1     ).
Let  (b  |b) denote the continuously differentiable penalty function of skewing bids satisfying the following assumptions: First,  (b|b) = 0 (no penalty from submitting a bid that matches Blue Book prices). Second,
= 0 (when the bids match the engineer's estimates, the first order costs of skewing are zero). These two assumptions seem natural given the practices of Caltrans. Third,  (b  |b) is strictly convex, and finally,
These last two assumptions guarantee an interior solution to the bidders' optimization problem in the choice of b  . For convenience we henceforth drop b and use  (b  ) This completes the specification of revenues as,
Equilibrium Bidding Behavior
We use Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the static first-price sealed-bid auction as our solution concept. The game is a scoring auction with independent private values in the spirit of Che (1993) . and is a special case of the multidimensional-type model of Asker and Cantillon (2008) where the project is fixed, with the buyer's objective being trivially fixed given the fixed scoring rule. Similar to Che's "productive potential" and Asker and Cantillon's "pseudotype," our equilibrium behavior will be determined as if our bidders have a unidimensional type. The reason is that given the scoring rule, the choice of   = b  · q  is separable from the optimal choice of the actual bid vector b  . 10 As a result, the Bayesian game will have a unique pure strategy monotonic equilibrium.
It is therefore useful to decompose bidder 's problem into two steps. First, given a score , we solve for the optimal bid conditional on winning the auction. This will result in the
Then, given b  () we solve for the optimal score   that the bidder would like to submit.
The first problem of choosing the optimal bid function given a score  is given by
Solving (2) yields  + 1 first order conditions (FOCs), the first  being,
and the last being the constraint.
After (implicitly) solving for b  (  ) we can complete the bidder's optimization problem of choosing his optimal score   . Let   (·) be the cumulative distribution function of contractor 's score,    The probability that contractor  with a score of   bids more than contractor  is   (  ). Thus, the bidder's expected profit function is,
Substituting revenues with (1) and recalling that
From our assumptions on the densities of types and on the penalty function  (·),   (·)
is differentiable with density   (·), and the FOCs of the two stages of optimization are necessary and sufficient for describing optimal bidder behavior.
A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is a collection of bid functions, b  (·) and scores   that simultaneously satisfy the system (3) and (4) for all bidders  ∈ {1  }. As stated above, there is a unique monotonic equilibrium in pure strategies, and we will therefore use (4) as the basis for our empirical analysis.
The FOC (4) provides some insight into a firm's optimal bidding strategy, and relates to the established literature of bidding without adaptation costs and changes. When q  = q  and when there are no ex post changes, the FOC (4) reduces to
which is the FOC for standard first price, private value asymmetric auction models. Our model is therefore a variant of the standard models of bidding for procurement contracts.
(See, e.g., Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Athey and Haile (2006) ). That is, the markups reflect the contractors' cost advantage and information rents as captured in the right hand side of (5).
The innovation in (4) is the introduction of empirically measurable terms that were ignored in previous procurement studies, most notably the adaptation costs reflected in .
To see this, suppose that the contractor expects a deduction of $1,000. The first order condition suggests that the contractor will raise his bid by (1 +   ) × 1 000. Hence, the total costs of the deductions, as borne by the firm, are indirectly borne by Caltrans.
Clearly, this model abstracts away from what are known to be fundamentally hard problems such as substituting the perfect foresight assumption on changes and actual quantities with a common values specification in which each bidder has signals of these variables. Despite these limitations, however, our first order conditions at a minimum generalize models previously imposed in both the theoretical and empirical literature, which implicitly impose the assumption that   = 0 for all  ∈ { +   −   }. As we demonstrate shortly, this null hypothesis is strongly rejected by the data.
Data
Our unit of observation is a paving contract procured by Caltrans from 1999 through 2005. 11 We index the projects by  = 1  . Many of the variables in the theoretical section are directly measured in our data, and we use superscript () to index these variables for
denotes the unit price for item  submitted by bidder  on project . The sample includes  = 819 projects with a total awarded value of $2.21
billion. There were a total of 3,661 bids submitted by 349 general contractors. Table 1 lists the top 20 contractors in our data set and their market share. 12 Over 11 Contract details from 2001 and the first half of 2003 are no longer accessible from Caltrans, so our sample does not include contracts from these two periods. 12 Market size is defined as the value of the winning bids for the projects in our data set (not the final payments made to the contractors.) We focus on contracts for which asphalt is at least one third of the project's monetary value. We exclude contracts that were not awarded to the lowest bidder (which represent half of the participating contractors, 193 firms, never won a government asphalt contract during the period and only 2 firms participated in more than 10 percent of the auctions.
To account for asymmetry in size and experience, we let    be a dummy variable equal to one if firm  is a "fringe" firm, defined as a firm that won less than 1 percent of the value of contracts awarded. Table 2 compares bidding by the top and fringe firms.
For each project, we collected information from the publicly available bid summaries and final payment forms that include the project number, the bidding date, the location of the job, other information about the nature of the job and bidder identities with their itemized bids. Projects have an average of 33 items, although one project has 326 items.
For each item, we have the unit prices for all bidders, along with the estimated quantity.
We also obtained the engineer's estimate of the project's cost. This measure, provided to potential bidders before proposals are submitted, is intended to represent the "fair and reasonable price" the government expects to pay for the work to be performed. This
, the dot product of Blue Book prices and the estimated quantities for project . Caltrans measures   using the Blue Book prices published in the Contract Cost Data Book (CCDB), an item-level data summary prepared annually by Caltrans' Division of Office Engineer. 13 We have merged this information into our data set. Thus, a unique feature of our data is that we directly measure all the tasks and we have a cost estimate for every task. Such detailed cost information is rare in procurement studies and it allows us to incorporate an appealing set of controls in our regression analysis.
From the final payment forms, we collect data on the actual quantities,  ()   used for each item. Additionally, the forms record the adjustments, extra work, and deductions that contribute to the total price of the project. These correspond to the variables 
− ,  () and  () introduced in the previous section. only 3.1 percent of all projects.) We also exclude 31 contracts for which there was only one recorded bidder and 65 contracts for which there is no itemized record of the final payment or pages missing from record files. Lastly, during this time period, there were 22 paving contracts that were structured as "A+B" contracts, where bidders submit a bid on the number of days to completion as well as unit bids on itemized tasks. These types of contracts only appear later in the sample and are excluded. Table A1 in the online appendix shows the bidding activities of the top 20 firms. 13 See the "Plans, Specifications, and Estimates Guide," published by the Caltrans' Division of Office Engineer for information about the formation of this estimate. Not all items have values in this source. For items with no CCDB value, we derive an estimate for  using the average of the low bidder's unit price on an item over all contracts in a given district and year. This averaging method is consistent with the method professional estimating companies use to create benchmark prices for the CCDB. This   had an  2 of 0.66 when regressed on the estimates we received from the CCDB. Furthermore, when we regress a constructed measure of
on the engineer's total estimate from our data, the  2 is 0.985.
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To account for the advantage of geographic proximity (transportation cost) we measure the distance of firm  from project , denoted as  Table 4 summarizes these calculated measures based on the ranking of bids. 14 As expected, contractors who submit the lowest bids also tend to have the shortest travel distances, reflecting their cost advantage.
A firm's bidding behavior may be influenced by its production capacity and project backlog. Firms that are working close to capacity face a higher opportunity cost when considering an additional job. Following Porter and Zona (1993) , we construct a measure of backlog from the record of winning bids, bidding dates, and project working days. We assume that work proceeds at a constant pace over the length of the project, and define the variable  ()  to be the remaining dollar value of projects won but not yet completed at the time a new bid is submitted. 15 We then define    ()  as the maximum backlog experienced for any day during the sample period, and the utilization rate   ()  as the ratio of backlog to capacity. For those firms that never won a contract, the backlog, capacity, and utilization rate are all set to 0. 16 Firms may take into account their competitors' positions when devising their own bids.
We therefore include measures of their closest rival's distance and utilization rate. We define  ()  as the minimum distance to the job site among 's rival bidders on project .
is the minimum utilization rate among 's rival bidders on project .
Summary statistics for the projects and the bids are provided in Tables 3 and 4 (as well   as in Tables A2 and A3 in the online appendix.) There is noticeable heterogeneity in the size of projects awarded: the mean value of the winning bid is $2.7 million with a standard deviation of $6.9 million. The difference between the first and second lowest bids averages $181,340, meaning that bidders leave some "money on the table." On average, the projects require 108 working days to complete, and several change orders are processed. The final 14 The contract often provides the location of the project as the cross streets at which highway construction begins and ends. Where the information is less precise we use the city's centroid or a best estimate based on the post mile markers and highway names included in the contract. We record distance using the address of each bidder as calculated by Mapquest. When a bidder has multiple office locations we use the one closest to the job site. For projects with multiple locations we take the average of the distances to each location. Using Mapquest's estimated travel time rather than distance produced quantitatively similar results. price paid for the work exceeds the winning bid by an average of $190,376 (5.8 percent of the estimate). As Table 4 shows, some of this discrepancy can be attributed to over and under-runs on project items. Large deviations also induce a correction to the item's total price, captured by the value of adjustments. In our sample, the mean adjustment is $142,035. Compensation for extra work negotiated after change orders, as well as deductions, contribute to the difference, averaging $176 256 and (−$8 615) respectively. These suggest a substantial degree of incompleteness in the original contracts.
As Athey and Levin (2001) show, contractors can raise profits by skewing their bids upwards (downwards) on items that are expected to overrun (under-run). Table 5 examines bid-skewing by reporting a regression of the unit prices on the percent by which that particular item overran. The left hand side variable is the unit price divided by an estimate of the CCDB unit costs. 17 The coefficient on percent overrun is 00465, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. That is, if a contractor expected a 10% overrun on some item, he would shade his bid up on that item by approximately 05%, a modest amount. When we allow for heteroskedasticity within an item code by using fixed or random item effects, the coefficient on percent overrun is similar, although with 1 519 types of items, these effects do not add much explanatory power to the regression. This evidence suggests that incentives to skew are not a major determinant of the observed bids.
Reduced Form Estimates

Bid Regressions
We begin our analysis by performing some common reduced form regressions to determine what best explains the total bids. A typical reduced form approximation to equation (5) implies that b () · q () should be determined by costs and measures of market power.
We control for firm 's costs using four terms. First is the engineer's cost estimate.  will measure firm 's free capacity. Finally, we allow the bids to differ by firm size and include an indicator,   ()  for fringe firms as described above.
A bidder's markup over costs will also depend on publicly observed information about its competitors, for which we use three terms as follows. Firm  will have more market power when () the distance of its closest competing rival to the project,  ()   is farther, () when its rivals capacity utilization,    ()  , is higher, and () when the number of bidders,  () , is greater.
The impact of our covariates on the bids will be proportional to the engineer's cost
One would expect increasing 's distance by 10 miles will raise the bid more on a contract with a $5 million dollar estimate than one with a $500,000 dollar estimate. It is also natural to expect the variance of the error term to be proportional to
The efficiency of our regression estimates would be improved by dividing our regression through by
propose estimating the following equation:
We include project fixed effects (  ) and firm fixed effects (  ). Project fixed effects control for information that is publicly observed by all the firms but not by us. Firm fixed effects control for omitted cost shifters of firms that are persistent across auctions. Regressions such as (6) are often used. (See, e.g., Porter and Zona (1993) ).
Results from estimating (6), and its variants, are displayed in Table 6 . Fringe status is significant and has positive signs as expected; fringe firms bid 3.4 to 4.7% higher than more established competitors. Distance is positive and significant in all but one specification; a firm located 94 miles from the project (the sample average) would bid about 1% more than a firm that is adjacent to the project. Increases in rival's distance allows a firm to increase its own bid by 2-3% for every 100 miles. The number of firms in a market has the expected sign; adding an additional bidder to the job lowers bids by about 1.5%.
The goodness of fit in columns I and II is low. In columns III and IV, we add project and firm fixed effects. The results suggest that both of these variables add considerably to goodness of fit, particularly project fixed effects. These effects capture characteristics such as the condition of the job site, the difficulty of the tasks, and anticipated changes. As column V shows, substituting project fixed effects with project random-effects has almost no impact on the results.
Accounting for Changes and Adaptation Costs
While regressions such as those in Table 6 are common, equation (4) suggests that they suffer from two sources of misspecification. First, the dependent variable is the total estimated bid, b  · q   instead of the (expected) total payment, b  · q   Second, the regressions ignore the anticipated changes to payments due to adjustments, extras and deductions. Based on equation (4), we re-specify the reduced form regression as follows:
The regression in (7) is similar to that in (6) . However, the dependent variable is now consistent with (4). As before, we correct for heteroskedasticity related to project size by dividing through by an estimate of that size, b () · q () .
Equation (4) implies that the marginal impact of an extra dollar of change identifies the adaptation costs in our model. Following the logic of (4), our estimates of  2 through  5 offer estimates of the adaptation cost coefficients as follows: 18
The results of these least-square regressions appear in Table 7 . As columns I, II and III demonstrate, including only the cost shifters of the firm and its competitors as covariates yields results similar to columns II, IV and V in Table 6 . 19 Project fixed effects absorb a great deal of variation, consistent with unobserved project-specific heterogeneity. Note that the regression in Table 7 , column II, is almost identical the to regression in Table 6 , column
IV, yet the  2 increases slightly when the the dependent variable is unit prices times the actual quantities, as suggested by (4). This is subtle evidence that ex post information better explains the observed bids.
Next, we include the ex post changes: positive and negative adjustments (  () and  () ), extra work ( () ) and deductions ( () ), all normalized by dividing through by b () · q () . The regression results without project-specific effects are shown in column IV, with project fixed effects in column V, and with project random effects in column VI. 20 The coefficients on ex post changes are similar in all three columns, and most are highly significant. 21 The results provide evidence that adaptations impose significant frictions. For example, in columns IV-VI of Table 7 , the coefficient of about (−18) on negative adjustments suggests that negotiations over negative adjustments carry with them $08 adaptation costs for every dollar in adjustments. If bidders anticipate negative adjustments then they tend to raise their bids not only to recoup the expected loss, but also to recover the adaptation costs they will expend while haggling over price changes.
With no adaptation costs the coefficients on positive adjustments should equal −1. The coefficient of about 08 implies that firms actually raise their bids when they expect this additional ex post compensation because they expect to spend $18 in adaptation costs for every dollar they obtain in adjustment compensation. This may seem bizarre, but a simple rent-seeking story can rationalize this result. 22 Similarly, the coefficient of 016 on extra work implies that firms expect to spend $116
in costs for every dollar they obtain in adjustment compensation. 23 Adaptation costs on deductions are much smaller and less significant, which may be a result of the low frequency of deductions in the data. 20 In column V, we estimate the project fixed effects along with the firm-specific controls in a first step, then regress those fixed effects on measures of ex post changes to the project. We acknowledge that, because the number of bids per contract is small and not approaching infinity, these fixed effects estimates are not consistently estimated. We prefer the results using random effects, but include both to show how little the estimates change under different specifications. 21 We also report the impact of changes to individual item quantities on bids. Our model predicts that this could impact the bids through the skewing penalty. We constructed a measure,  ()  which is defined as the sum of the dollar overrun on individual items, divided by the project estimate. This dollar overrun is computed by multiplying the difference in the actual and estimated quantity by the item cost estimate reported in the Contract Cost Data Book, . Since not all contract items are contained in the data book,  () should be thought of as a partial project overrun due to quantity changes in the more standard items. The coefficient on  () is significant, but very small in magnitude. 22 For example, imagine that ex post Caltrans wishes to impose negative adjustments of −$1, which will be enforced if the firm does not contest. Instead, the firm can pay haggling costs (time, legal fees, etc.) of $18, after which it will be able to collect a positive adjustment of $1. Since the costs are lower than the benefit ($2), this will result in an observation of $1 in positive adjustments ex post, but a rational increase in the ex ante bid of $1.8. 23 Our regressions imperfectly control for costs from extra work. In our structural model, presented in the next section, we attempt to deal with this by bounding the potential bias from omitted costs.
Endogenous Ex Post Changes and Omitted Costs
A concern with the analysis above is that ex post changes may be correlated with the error term because of omitted costs that are observed by the bidders for which we cannot control.
For instance, a project in a more mountainous area will impose higher production costs and will be more likely to require changes due to the more challenging terrain. If so, projects with more changes have higher costs not because of adaptation costs but because of higher production costs in rough terrains. Another plausible story is that very complex projects impose serious delays and difficulties that increase the labor costs of production. If these delays are the source of adjustments and deductions then the increased bids may actually be a consequence of the increased production costs.
Recall that we observe the actual quantities used for each itemized component of the contract, and have excellent cost data from the CCDB. If delays are accompanied by higher costs of production, much of this will be captured by higher actual quantities of specified contract items because these are controlled for by b () · q () , which in a simple univariate regression explains 97.4% of the variation in the ex post bid. Hence, it seems safe to believe that any omitted costs will be negligible. Nonetheless, we proceed to implement an instrumental variable approach to correct for the possible endogeneity of ex post changes to compensation by identifying an exogenous variable that affects ex post changes but does not affect the unobserved project-specific production costs. In particular, we use the identity of the Caltrans project engineer who supervised the project (i.e., the project manager) to capture exogenous shocks to ex post changes.
While Caltrans highway contracts have numerous clauses devoted to changes, incomplete contracts imply that project engineers have considerable discretion over the scope of changes and deductions, and the process through which these changes are governed. It is well known in the industry that there is considerable heterogeneity in the propensity of engineers to make changes to the contract or impose deductions. Like in many fields, some engineers are naturally adept at dealing with conflict and solving disputes while others are not. Some engineers are harder to work with because of their propensity to impose deductions and adjustments, causing disruptions to the efficient flow of work and imposing undesirable renegotiation costs. Because every project is assigned to an engineer who handles several projects, the identity of the engineer will shift the distribution of ex post changes to the contracts he manages, independent of the specific project characteristics.
For the engineer's identity to be a valid instrument it must be: (i ) correlated with the endogenous variables (changes), and (ii) uncorrelated with the error term. Condition (i)
is fairly easy to verify. Our 819 contracts were handled by 334 unique engineers. After dropping the 154 engineers who handle only one contract we are left with 180 engineers, each managing at least 2 of the remaining 665 contracts. 24 First-stage regressions of the potentially endogenous ex post changes on dummy variables for these engineers confirm instrument strength particularly for positive adjustments to compensation and overruns on itemized contract elements, but suggest that they may be weak with regard to extra work and deductions. See the online appendix for F-statistics and further details about instrument quality.
Condition (ii ) is not possible to verify directly since it is an identifying assumption, but it is very plausible because of the way that contracts are assigned to engineers according to the following sequence of events. 25 The Caltrans engineering staff first draws the plans and specifications for a given project. The project is then publicly advertised and the plans, specifications and other bidding documents are made available to bidders. The location of the project allows bidders to determine the district office from which the engineer will be assigned. There are a handful of engineers at a given district office and they are matched to projects based upon their expertise and availability. In most cases the engineer is assigned early and noted on the project plans for bidders to contact prior to bidding with questions about certain specifications. After bids are submitted and a winner is chosen, work begins and changes to the project are made based upon work progress and site conditions.
Identification also requires that our instrument be mean-independent of the unobserved costs  ()  One might worry that project engineers predisposed to change the contract are assigned in a nonrandom way to more or less complicated projects. We find, instead, that the best predictor of the assignment of a project engineers to contracts is which of the 12 district offices the engineer works at: 96% of the engineers work in a single district.
However, district dummies alone do not predict 
−   () and  () . All districts have, on average, a similar share of projects that experience large changes. The scarce supply of engineers in any given district, each with a limited capacity to take on projects, 24 In this set, the mean number of contracts per engineer is 3.69 with a standard deviation of 2.04. The total value of projects managed by each engineer has a mean of $9.94 million and a standard deviation of $13.6 million (using the engineer's estimate). Our data consists of only asphalt contracts, while Caltrans engineers also manage other contracts, hence the small number of contracts per engineer. 25 Any variable known at the time of bidding is a valid instrument (Hansen and Singleton (1982)) because anything known at the time of bidding cannot be correlated with the forecast error of payoff relevant variables.
generates exogeneity in how engineers are assigned to projects with many changes.
Another test of random assignment is to regress measures of engineer experience on ex post changes. We observe how many projects are assigned to a particular engineer, which we interpret as a proxy for experience or productivity. We regress this variable on
−   () and  () . Nonrandom assignment implies that more experienced engineers are assigned to projects with more changes. However, the  2 in this regression was less than 0.01 and none of the coefficients on ex-post change variables were significant.
We present the instrumental variable estimates in columns VII, VIII and IX of Table 7 .
In column VIII, as in column V, we regress the project level fixed effects on measures of ex post changes to the project. Notice that the estimated values using our instruments are similar to those from the OLS estimation in columns IV through VI. The estimated adaptation costs for adjustments are very similar in magnitude and significance, while those for extra work and especially deductions are higher in magnitude. All are statistically significant in the fixed effects regression, and most are in the other two specifications (columns VII and IX).
Structural Estimation
The reduced form analysis suggests that contractors build sizeable adaptation costs into their bids in anticipation of ex post changes. However, much of the literature on contracting has focused on other sources of distortion, primarily rents from private information and market power, and, more recently, strategically skewed bidding. In order to assess the relative magnitude of these distortions alongside those coming from adaptation costs, we require a method for structurally estimating the model discussed in Section 3.
Our estimation approach builds on the two-step nonparametric estimators discussed in Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) and in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000).
In the first step, we estimate the density and CDF of the bid distributions for project ,
 (  ) respectively. In the second step, we estimate a particular form of the penalty from skewed bidding and the adjustment cost coefficients,   +    −    and   , by using the first order conditions in (4) to form a GMM estimator.
This approach also addresses some potential sources of misspecification in the reduced form analysis. 26 First, we note that since bidders will be uncertain about the magni-tude of ex post changes, the first order conditions should include the expected values of  () ,  () ,   () and  () instead of their actual values. The standard econometric analysis of measurement error suggests that this will bias our reduced form estimates of adaptation costs. Second, our reduced form regressions imperfectly approximate the first order conditions. For instance, we attempt to capture market power by including  ()  and    ()  as regressors. However, we can more precisely assess market power by directly including the probability of winning, as implied by the first order conditions (e.g. the right-hand side term in (5)).
Finally, we note that the structural model allows us to better flesh out the interpretation of the error term, which is important for assessing the plausibility of the instruments used for estimation. We propose instruments that allow for consistent estimation of the adaptation costs when there are two sources of endogeneity. The first are the unobserved cost shocks discussed in Section 4.3. The second are the expectational errors, mentioned above. While the structural model uses different econometric methods, we shall find a great deal of consistency with our reduced form results.
Estimating Bid Distributions
Since we wish to include measures of firm-specific distance and other controls for cross firm heterogeneity, nonparametric approaches would suffer from a curse of dimensionality. 27 Hence, we will estimate  ()  (  ) and  ()  (  ) semiparametrically. We first run a regression similar to those in Table 6 :
where, as before, the dependent variable is the normalized estimated bid and  ()  includes the firm's distance and whether or not it is a fringe firm. We also include an auction-specific random effect,  ()  to control for project-specific characteristics that are observed by the bidders but not the econometrician. 28 27 Specifically, the sample size required in order to achieve the same level of precision in the estimates increases dramatically as the number of covariates included in the kernel regression increases. See, for example, Table 4 .2 of Silverman (1986), as well as the Handbook of Econometrics chapter by Athey and Haile (2007) and the references therein. 28 As Krasnokutskaya (2011) has emphasized, failure to account for this form of unobserved heterogeneity may lead to a considerable bias in the structural estimates. However, the strategies proposed in the literature for dealing with such heterogeneity, including Krasnokutskaya's deconvolution-style estimator and the parametric approach of Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011), are not straightforward to apply in our more
Let b
 denote the estimated value of  and let b  ()  denote the fitted residual. We assume that the residuals to this regression are iid with distribution (·). The iid assumption would be satisfied if the noise on total costs had a multiplicative structure, which we describe in detail in the next subsection. Under these assumptions, for project :
That is, the distribution of the residuals,  
Estimating Adaptation Costs
As demonstrated in Section 5, the engineering cost estimate, b () · q () , is an excellent predictor of the bids. Therefore, we assume that firm 's cost is a variant of the engineer's cost estimate with the following multiplicative structure:
That is, actual total costs for firm  are a deviation from the engineer's cost estimate represented as a random variable e  ()  times the engineering estimate b () · q () . The assumption in (8) is similar to the multiplicative structure used in Krasnokutskaya (2011) .
A similar assumption is also implicit in Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter (2003) where the authors normalize lots by tract size. We assume that e  ()  are iid. complicated framework. Instead, our use of random effects requires that the auction-specific effect  () is mean independent of the bidder's private information, a restriction that is analogous to the independence requirements of Krasnokutskaya's more general deconvolution approach. As a robustness check we also estimated a version of the model with fixed effects and found little quantitative change in our results. We do not rely upon these fixed effects results, however, because with a finite number of bidders per contract, we have an incidental parameters problem and cannot consistently estimate the distribution of residuals.
By substituting (8) into the bidder's first order condition (4), dividing by b () · q () , explicitly writing out the various adaptations costs in , and rearranging terms we can write
To complete our structural model we also include two additional sources of error in equation (9) . The first source of error is that discussed in Section 4.3, the potential endogeneity of ex-post changes due to unobserved cost shocks. Recall that these omitted costs are observed by the firms, but not already accounted for in our cost estimate b () · q () .
These costs may be correlated with  we do not directly observe bidders' expectations. We therefore use well known strategies for Euler Equations estimation (described below) to estimate the model. We denote the expectational error as
Given these two additional sources of error,  () and  () , we can rewrite (9) as: (10) is identical to (9) except that we have brought over the two additional sources of error to the left hand side. Taken together, we can define this composite error e  ()
denote the value of the instrument for bidder  in auction  we will use (10) to form the moment condition below:
As in our reduced form analysis, we use engineer identities as our primary instruments as they are uncorrelated with the unobserved cost shocks,  () . They are also uncorrelated with the expectational errors, by definition, because the engineer is typically known at the time bidding occurs. We also include the engineer's cost estimate as an instrument because it is a natural shifter of the bidding strategies and thus, is correlated with the right hand side variables in (10) . We index the moment condition by  to emphasize that the asymptotics of our problem depend on the number of auctions in our sample growing large. Let b  and b  denote a first stage estimate of the bid densities and distributions Let  be a positive semi-definite weight matrix. We use the following GMM estimator:
The optimal weighting matrix can be calculated by using the inverse of the sample variance of   (·) from a first step estimate which uses the identity weighting matrix. Newey (1994) demonstrates that under suitable regularity conditions this estimator has normal asymptotics despite depending on a nonparametric first stage. Furthermore, the asymptotic variance surprisingly does not depend on how the nonparametric first stage is conducted, as long as it is consistent. The first stage estimates of b  and b  are quite precise given our regression coefficients (there are over 3600 individual bids). Therefore, it is quite unlikely that our first stage bid density and distribution estimates introduce significant bias into the estimates.
Lastly, we need to specify a particular functional form for the skewing penalty function  (b  ) We use a convenient special case of the conditions we imposed on  (b  ) as follows, 29
We chose this specification because the penalty increases for bids that are further away from the engineering estimate, and these get more weight when the actual quantity is further away from the estimated one. While we could consider a more flexible penalty function, the number of observations will limit the number of parameters we can include in this term. This, together with our objective of keeping the structure of the model as close to the standard literature as possible, is why we introduce this fairly parsimonious specification.
Estimating Markups
Given the estimates
, we can recover an estimate of the contractors' implied markups. Using the functional form in (11) we estimate b   , contractor 's total cost for installing the actual quantities by evaluating the empirical analogue of (4): 
Results
We summarize the structural estimates in Tables 8-11 . Table 8 reports the parameter values from our semiparametric GMM estimator. The adaptation cost estimates are similar to the reduced form estimates discussed in Section 4. For instance, the last column of Table 8 implies that every dollar of positive adjustment generates an additional $2.24 of 29 Strictly speaking, this does not guarantee that  (b  |b)
is very large, but we still assume that an interior solution exists. The estimates act as a reasonable reality check.
adaptation costs, while a negative adjustment generates an additional $2.69, though this later estimate is not statistically significant. Recall that our results control for the quantities that were actually installed by the contractor, b · q  . Moreover, as we described in the previous section, we have instrumented for the endogeneity of adjustments to account for a possible bias from remaining omitted cost variables. Therefore, we argue that this estimate reflects adaptation costs instead of omitted production costs  () . It is worth noting that our reduced form estimates from Table 7 Column IX were smaller, at $1.92 and $0. The estimated value of the skewing parameter,  is -1.203E-05. Although the negative sign is inconsistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, this estimate is not statistically significant at standard levels. It is also extremely small in monetary terms and has no appreciable impact on profits or overall costs. The result that there are no large penalties from skewing is quite robust to alternative specifications for the functional form of the skewing penalty. However, recall from Section 1 that positive and negative adjustments are essentially due to renegotiating unit prices. As an empirical matter, it may be difficult to separately identify a quadratic effect of overruns and underruns, as captured in  from the linear effect captured in   + and   − .
In Tables 9 and 10 , we summarize our estimates of bidders' markups. Our results suggest that the industry is quite competitive. The median profit margin is 3.8 percent for all bids and 12.1 percent for winning bids. We note that Granite Construction Inc., the largest bidder in our data, is a publicly traded company and reported a net profit margin of 3.1 percent in 2005. The construction industry average according to Standard and Poors is 1.9 percent. Profit margins based on SEC filings and our conception of profits differ in many respects. However, the available direct evidence on profit margins suggests that the construction industry is quite competitive and our results are consistent with this evidence.
As Table 9 demonstrates, markups over direct costs ¡ b  − c  ¢ ·q  are considerably higher than the profit margin. This is because our analysis distinguished between the direct costs of completing the project without adaptation costs and the added adaptation costs. The median markup over direct costs, In Table 10 , we compare the estimates in Table 9 with the estimated markups found using more standard methods that ignore the ex post changes to quantities and payments. Using
, we evaluate the empirical analogue of equation (5), which is essentially the estimator discussed in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) . Equation (5) is a special case of our model when we assume that q  = q  and that that ex post changes can be excluded from the FOCs. Previous empirical structural models of first price procurement auctions make these assumptions. Using this approach, the median total markup is $161,277, or 12.2% of the estimate for winning bidders. These results almost exactly match the median profit margins reported in the last two rows of Table 9 . By comparing the FOCs of the two models, this should not be surprising. The only difference in the net profit margin under the two approaches comes from the skewing penalty and the discrepancies between estimated and actual item quantities. Ex post changes will shift the bid, changing what we refer to as the direct markup, but do not alter the contractors' net profit margins. This is an important observation to the extent that it is a consequence of the "pass through" of costs: the profit margins over total costs are practically the same in both empirical models. However, our approach distinguishes the direct costs from the adaptation costs that follow from incompletely specified contracts. Our results therefore suggest that the standard FOC used in previous empirical studies is misspecified because it does not account for ex post changes. In our application, failing to account for contract adaptations leads to estimates with a very different economic interpretation, and as discussed below, with very different policy implications. 
Implications for Government Procurement
Our analysis offers some lessons for the design of procurement auctions. The first is that the existing system does a good job of limiting rents and promoting competition. The  markup is modest, with the median bidder in our sample expecting a profit of 3.8% of the estimate. More interesting, though, is how firms make their markup. Because adaptation costs erode more than any positive gains from change orders, firms increase their bids ex ante to extract high rents on prespecified project items. Among winning bidders the median value of this direct markup, (b  − c  ) · q   is 17.7% of the project's estimated costs.
Second, both the reduced form and structural estimates imply that adaptation costs are substantial. The implied adaptation costs range from 60 cents to almost three dollars for every dollar in change. These numbers might be surprising to economists who empha- 31 Industry sources suggest that a twenty percent profit margin on change orders is most common. It is helpful to recall that our cost estimate controls for the quantities actually installed and that positive and negative adjustments are effectively changes to compensation from the unit prices. Hence, these are a pure transfer and do not involve additional costs that we have not controlled for in our cost estimate. 32 This makes the reasonable assumption that firms do not negotiate ex post changes that result in them losing money. The bounds on adaptation costs that were derived in Section 5.4 suggest that Caltrans spent on average $318 million to $462 million on adaptation costs during our five and a half year sample period. The average ratio of adaptation costs to the winning bid is 0.08 to 0.146. Even half of our lower bound would be substantial. An implication of competition is that Caltrans, and hence the taxpayer, is ultimately responsible for expected adaptation costs on the project as they are directly passed on from the bidders. Of course, we have no way of estimating the direct adaptation costs born by Caltrans in the form of legal fees and other haggling costs, which probably add significant costs. Since the source of these costs is the incompleteness of project design and specifications, an obvious policy implication is to consider increasing the ex ante costs and efforts put into estimating and specifying projects before they are let out for bidding. Our analysis does not allow us to speculate on the costs and benefits of adding more engineering efforts ex ante, and it would be impossible to avoid contractual incompleteness and the implied agency problems altogether. However, since the magnitude of adaptation costs is sizeable, there is room to consider some experimentation with more careful and costly design efforts, and to carefully examine the results of any such added effort in ex ante engineering.
In related work, Bajari Also, negotiated contracts are more commonly used for projects that appear to be the most complex for which ex post changes in plans and specifications are likely.
A perceived advantage of negotiated contracts is that they allow the architect, buyer and contractor to discuss the project plans so that the contractor can point out pitfalls and suggest modifications to the project design before work begins. Furthermore, negotiated contracts are often based on cost plus compensation. As discussed in Bajari and Tadelis (2001) , the poor incentives to control costs that cost plus contracts provide are compensated for by the ease in which renegotiating terms is achieved. When changes occur, the contractor presents his receipts for the additional expenses and is reimbursed, thus avoiding the often acrimonious process of negotiating change orders and reducing adaptation costs. The results of this paper complement these previous papers by confirming that adaptation costs are high in the construction industry, so that economizing on ex post adaptation costs is an important potential source of cost savings. This may outweigh the benefits of competitive bidding in selecting the lowest cost contractor, and providing the contractor with strong incentives to lower production costs.
In the public sector, the use of negotiated contracts is problematic. Allowing for greater discretion in contractor selection increases the possibility for favoritism, kick backs and political corruption. The competitive bidding system is less prone to corruption since it allows for free entry by qualified bidders and there is an objective criteria for selecting the winning bidder. An important policy issue is whether it is possible to construct a mechanism that balances ex post adaptation costs with the potential for corruption. To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been explored in the existing theoretical literature. Our research suggests that developing such a mechanism could dramatically improve efficiency in public sector procurement. There were a total of 347 active bidders for asphalt concrete construction contracts in our sample between 1999 and 2005. The firms listed above are the top 20 firms from our sample, ranked according to their market share, i.e. the share of total contract dollars awarded. The remaining firms each have less than 1% market share and are designated as fringe firms. 109,624 109,624 The dependent variable is the unit price bid on each contract item, normalized by the Contract Cost Data Book (CCDB) value. The percent unit overrun is the percent difference between the actual and estimated quantities reported for that item. Because the pricing strategy a bidder uses for one item is related to its pricing strategy for all other items within a contract, we expect the residuals to be correlated across items for a given bidder and contract. To account for this correlation, standard errors clustered by bidder-contract are used to compute t-Statistics, shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is the vector product of the unit price bids and the actual quantities, divided by a measure of the project size ( b q act  ). Cluster-robust standard errors are used to compute t-Statistics, shown in parentheses.
NOverrun is a measure of the quantity-related overrun on standard contract items (those that have a CCDB unit price estimate). This overrun is calculated as the vector product of the CCDB prices (where available) and the difference between actual and estimated quantities. .0%] The total adaptation cost is calculated as 2.235 (A + ) + 2.689|A -| + 1.233 (X) +1.630|D|. We consider this to be an upper bound because it attributes the coefficient on extra work to pure transaction costs, rather than marginal costs of production. This amounts to an assumption of a 100% profit margin on extra work, making it analogous to positive adjustments in compensation. A more conservative approach is presented in the bottom panel. In the extreme, firms may perform extra work at a zero profit margin, meaning each dollar awarded through a change in scope just covers the cost of performing that work. With $1 of marginal costs for every $1 of extra work, that still leaves approximately $0.23 to be explained by transaction or adaptation costs. Therefore we calculate a lower bound on adaptation costs as 2.235 (A + ) + 2.689 |A -| + 0.233 (X) +1.630|D|. The 95% confidence intervals, appearing in brackets, were calculated by taking the lower and upper confidence bounds of the parameter estimates and using them in the transaction cost equation instead of the point estimates.
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The following Appendix provides additional details about the data and estimation procedures used in the paper. Tables A1-A3 summarize the bidding behavior of the top 20 firms in our sample, the number of participants in each auction, and the distribution of these auctions over time. The next two tables present information about our use of instruments in the reduced form regressions of bids on contract characteristics and ex post changes. Specifically, in Table A4 , we present Fstatistics from first-stage regressions of the instruments. In light of some concerns about instrument strength, Table A5 demonstrates the robustness of our results by comparing model specifications which instrument for different subsets of the potentially endogenous variables. Finally, in Table A6 , we present results from the structural model in which we control for unobserved auction heterogeneity using fixed effects in the first-stage recovery of the bid distribution. 1 University of Minnesota and NBER 2 Texas A&M University 3 UC Berkeley Contracts in 1999  13  11  19  12  18  18  24  20  13  4  8  2  Contracts in 2000  12  14  23  36  16  26  10  39  24  21  20  8  Contracts in 2002  4  8  11  19  24  11  7  2  14  3  7  0  Contracts in 2003  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  8  5  4  2  6  Contracts in 2004  2  8  15  29  33  6  6  10  7  7  3  1  Contracts in 2005  4  10  24  26  23  17  5  6  10 10 5 4 . These suggest that the resident engineer's identity is only strongly correlated with positive adjustments and the dollar overrun on itemized tasks, but weakly correlated with extra work and deductions. This table reproduces six of the columns from Table 7 in the body of the paper. An additional column has been added for each of the no/fixed/random effects specifications, showing the estimates when we only instrument for NPosAdj and NOverrun where instrument strength is not an issue. Note the similarity in our estimates across specifications. As with Table 7 , the dependent variable for all nine regressions is the vector product of the unit price bids and the actual quantities, divided by a measure of the project size ( b q act  ). Cluster-robust standard errors are used to compute t-Statistics, shown in parentheses. NOverrun is a measure of the quantity-related overrun on standard contract items, calculated as the vector product of the CCDB prices (where available) and the difference between actual and estimated quantities. and District Dummies * These estimates represent an upper bound on transaction costs associated with changes in scope. They do not account for marginal costs associated with performing the extra work, which for a reasonable profit margin of 20 percent would lower our estimate by $0.80. ** Consistent GMM estimates were computed using the identity matrix as the weighting matrix. In a second step, efficient GMM estimates were computed using the optimal weighting matrix derived from the variance of the sample moments in the first step. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
